In this paper we study the morphogenesis of an institution when local social interactions are taken into account. The structure we obtain has characteristics of "self-organized criticality". After a transient period the system self-organizes into a configuration which is compatible with a high degree of differentiation among different sites and generates typical power laws.
INTRODUCTION
In abstract terms institutions can be defined as orderly and more or less persistent behaviour patterns, "rules or set of rules that constrain or govern organized patterns of behaviour" (Langlois, 1986 ). These patterns may emerge spontaneously, that is unintentionally, or may result from consciously designed rules of interactions.
In this paper we study the morphogenesis of an institution when local social interactions are taken into account. While much of the analysis of how institutions emerge and change over time has been developed within coordination and common interest games and has been mainly concerned with the evolution of conventions (see, among others, Ellison, 1993; Mailath, 1993; Young, 1993) , in this paper we study the morphogenesis of an institution, that is, the space-time pattern of the evolution of the players' actions, considering an "anti-coordination" payoff structure, focusing on local interactions and applying different techniques.
We study a lattice game in which some degree of stability is reached over time after agents have tuned their actions to the moves of their neighbour agents. The main result of the paper is that the structure we obtain has characteristics of "selforganized criticality" (Bak and Chen, 1991; Bak et al., 1988) . After a transient period the system selforganizes into a configuration which is compatible with a high degree of differentiation among different sites and generates power laws for the behaviour of objects such as spatial correlation functions. Notice that with the exception At each is subject to the realization of a random variable # uniformly distributed in [0, 1] .
The agent with the highest realization, say i*, moves first and chooses his best possible action.
(In this framework receiving the highest shock means that the agent, randomly selected, has had the most successful idea, "mutation", from which a superior technology, a piece of knowledge, a new pricing policy stem.) Other agents then move subsequently within this period choosing action or 0 depending on the actions and payoffs of each of their neighbours. As an example, suppose we start from an initial condition characterized by actions equal to 0 for all agents and therefore by 0 payoffs for all agents. The agent with the highest prevailing draw will choose action and therefore receive a payoff equal to 2, while the others continue to earn 0. The higher payoff earned by i* is assumed to be locally observable by the two neighbours i* and i*/ who will find it profitable to imitate i*'s action. Reorganization in the payoffs levels occurs as from Table I . For example, if at the end of period only i* and i* / are imitators, they will get a payoff equal to each, while i* will get -1 as a result of competition with cumulative payoffs equal to for all of them (see Table II ).
The idea reflected here is that an agent will imitate the action adopted by one of his neighbours Obviously, the "learning rule" we introduced above acts as a crucial element in the process of transmission in this system: Through the chain of neighbours the effects of local externalities may spread along long distances too, until reorganization in the payoff levels stops. The distribution of payoffs represents the distribution of property rights and we are interested in asking how property rights do evolve.
probability distribution for each site of being selected as the site with the new highest random shock as a function of the history of previous realizations of the shocks. The features of the random mechanism are such that at the beginning subsequent events are quite uncorrelated in space but after a transient period the distribution of the highest draws becomes stationary and events become correlated. Following Bak and Sneppen (1993) we can measure the distribution of the distance between subsequent sites in which actions are revised. Figure shows indeed In Fig. 2 we have obtained the surface representing the distribution of cumulative payoffs for a system consisting of 65 players after 10 100 runs of the game described in Section 2. Figure 2 represents the snapshot of a time-space stochastic process which starts with no asymmetries among players and, after a transient period, generates a highly asymmetric distribution of the payoffs in space. What is particularly interesting is the endogenous emergence of localized clusters of "successful" players, intermitted by less "successful" ones. Such configuration, which is characterized by a high degree of differentiation among different sites, can be interpreted as the market configuration resulting from the processes of diffusion of knowledge, technological competition, pricing policies, etc., described by the game in Section 2. Moreover, both an accurate analysis of the surface and the study of the standard deviation of the cumulative payoffs reached in the different sites as a function of the system size (Fig. 3) show the presence of fractal characteristics and self-affinity. One of these features is the roughness of the surface expressed by means of the standard deviation of the cumulative payoffs among sites. The roughness increases with the number of players following a power law, which means that the logarithmic transformation of the standard deviation increases linearly with the logarithm of the number of players, with a coefficient equal to 0.73. This is represented in Fig. 3 ; the standard deviation has been calculated starting from the cumulative payoffs for a number of players ranging from 50 to 1000 players expressed by u std(N) (IIi,t-lIt) that is, the numerosity of the sites which change actions, remains constant over time with a characteristic size of 4.32. The number of players which change actions and therefore register a change in payoffs defines the size of an "avalanche" and depends on the previous period configuration and the shocks realization. Then Fig. 4 Finally, Fig. 5 shows the intermittency of the evolution of the sites in which actions are revised.
We plot the date of a revision against the number of revisions and observe long periods of passivity punctuated here and there by sudden bursts of activity: Thus, the model exhibits "punctuated equilibria" (Gould and Eldredge, 1993) .
FINAL REMARKS
By explicitly recognizing the role of local structure on the gobal properties of an economic system a rich class of models can be developed. The approach and model of morphogenesis outlined above, although simplified, suggests a potentially fruitful direction where research could be addressed. The analysis of the spatio-temporal pattern of the evolution of the agent's action seems to us important to understand how agents interact and learn in path-dependent systems and how economic institutions and social norms evolve.
Our model is just one step towards understanding the general phenomenon of the effect of local structure on global properties.
